That’s the title of a paper of mine that is forthcoming in The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism. I’ve posted the abstract on academia.edu
Follow these links for reviews and discussions of my book Groove: A Phenomenology of Rhythmic Nuance (Bloomsbury Academic, 2014)
- Notes, review by Scott Gleason (Volume 73, Number 1, 2016)
- Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, review by Justin London (Volume 74, Issue 1, 2016)
- Journal of Aesthetics and Phenomenology, review by Milan Jilka (Volume 2, Issue 1, 2015)
- Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, review by Clément Canonne (2/18/2015)
- Dancecult: Journal of Electronic Dance Music Culture, review by Daniel Schnee (Vol 7, No 2, 2015)
- Choice: Current Reviews for Academic Libraries. (Mar. 2015)
- Under the Radar, by Frank Valish
- A few ideas from my book show up in “Film studies in the groove? Rhythmising perception in Carnal Locomotive,” by Catherine Grant (Necsus, European Journal of Media Studies, Spring, 2015).
- Portions of my view are put to interesting use in “Music and the Unconscious” by John Carvalho, presented at the conference, “Music and Consciousness” (University of Oxford, April 2015).
- Brettworks, by Thomas Brett
- My piece “From the Author’s Perspective…” in the Spring 2015 American Society for Aesthetics Newsletter: 35.1
- Groove back-cover endorsements
I’ve written a fairly lengthy piece—”From the Author’s Perspective: Groove: A Phenomenology of Rhythmic Nuance”—which appears in the new American Society for Aesthetics Newsletter. Here is the opening paragraph:
How should we understand the relationship between music and body movement? The common view is that a listener’s body movement is a reaction to, an effect of, perceiving music. I don’t doubt that this is, in part, correct. I claim in Groove, however, that moving our bodies is often something that we do in order to grasp certain rhythmic qualities; our movement is an integral part of a perceptual skill for grasping qualities such as a groove. We know that the perception of music is not passive; I view bodily movement as a component of one’s active perception of music. To develop this, I draw upon the phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s account of embodied perception, emphasizing his notion of motor intentionality. Before we get to this, though, let’s take a few steps back…
Read the rest here: 35.1
One of the ideas I leverage in my book, Groove, is the French phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s notion of motor intentionality.* Phenomenologists use the term “intentional” to refer to our directedness toward something. Merleau-Ponty’s idea is that, in certain movements, our bodily directedness toward objects constitutes a kind of practical, noncognitive understanding of them. (For example, I have a practical rather than intellectual understanding of the shape and flimsiness of this Coke can through the movements of my fingers and thumb.)
It’s commonly believed that a groove is, in some sense, the feel of a rhythm. But the feels of grooves seem somewhat mysteriously embodied. I try to make sense of this through a particular characteristic of motor intentionality. Notice that our motor-intentional understanding of something can be effective or ineffective. (A faulty understanding may result in my not succeeding in picking up the Coke; the can may slip from my hand, spill.) Merleau-Ponty believes we experience this wrongness and rightness of our bodily understanding as bodily feelings of tension, equilibrium, etc. I think that when we move to music we are attempting to understand it, bodily, through our movements.
I argue that this felt, affective dimension of motor intentionality is the basic nature of the feel of a groove. The embodied understanding of a groove, on the one hand, and the feel that informs this motor-intentional activity, on the other, are two sides of the same coin: to “get” a groove just is to comprehend it bodily and to feel that comprehension.
*For more on motor intentionality, see Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception. Also see Sean D. Kelly’s “Merleau-Ponty on the Body: The Logic of Motor Intentional Activity,” Ratio XV, no. 4 (2002): 376– 91. For more on Merleau-Ponty in general, see Taylor Carman’s Merleau-Ponty. London and New York: Routledge, 2008.
Folks, I’m teaching PHIL 260 “Philosophies of Art” in spring 2015 at Montclair. There are still 5 seats open!
Thanks to Thomas Brett for this thoughtful review.
Tiger C. Roholt’s Groove: a phenomenology of rhythmic nuance is a splendid, rigorous, and brief (140 pp) book that makes a compelling case for something many musicians already know something about: groove. Groove is the feel of a rhythm–that quality of musical time that can make it seem as though the music is pushing ahead or laying back. How a single musician, let alone an entire ensemble, has groove is somewhat mysterious. In a way, the ability to produce and perceive groove is a kind of body knowledge and its feel aspect “is a musician’s datum” (105). Roholt designs his book around four propositions: first, grooves have a feel; second, grooves somehow involve the body and its movement; third, to understand a groove is to feel it; and finally, feeling and understanding a groove does not occur in thought or in listening, but through the body (2).
Roholt introduces his topic…
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“For decades, philosophers and theorists of music have been promising an embodied phenomenology of music. Tiger C. Roholt’s Groove is an original and insightful essay that makes good on that promise. Roholt challenges analytic and quantificational approaches to rhythmic nuance and argues that grooves are non-conceptual, felt, and understood through bodily engagement. Full of smart musical examples and sound arguments, Groove is much more than just a book on rhythm or drumming. It is a cornerstone for any future phenomenology of music.”
BRIAN KANE, Associate Professor of Music, Yale University, USA
“Tiger C. Roholt’s energetic new study of a neglected but undeniably central aspect of rhythm represents a major step forward in understanding how and why music moves us as it does. Roholt writes both as a philosopher and as a player, which readers will quickly see is a great advantage on this topic, and he knows the value of examples, many of which are thoroughly absorbing in their own right. Roholt describes the motor-intentional process that actualizes the implicit groove of a song, giving us a new appreciation of the embodied character of this kind of aesthetic experience and the ‘groove-completing’ role of the listener. A wonderfully interesting study.”
GARRY L. HAGBERG, James H. Ottaway Jr. Professor of Philosophy and Aesthetics, Bard College. USA
“Exploring uncharted philosophical territory, Tiger C. Roholt’s smart, thorough account of groove pushes us to rethink the nature of music and musical engagement. Experiencing music is not merely Continue reading
PHIL 233 Contemporary Philosophers: Phenomenology and Art
The first half of this course will consist of an introduction to phenomenology in general—both Edmund Husserl’s brand of phenomenology and the existential phenomenology of Martin Heidegger and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. In the second half of the course, we will explore contemporary phenomenological examinations of art. We will consider different art forms, including music.
Some Deeper Reasons
Scott Samuelson considers the more profound benefits of studying philosophy in this Wall Street Journal article from March, 2014. Reacting to the many, recent employment-based arguments for studying philosophy, Samuelson writes, “America should strive to be a society of free people deeply engaged in ‘the pursuit of happiness’, not simply one of decently compensated employees. A true liberal-arts education furnishes the mind with great art and ideas, empowers us to think for ourselves, and appreciate the world in all its complexity and grandeur.” Samuelson in Wall Street Journal
In “Why I Teach Plato to Plumbers,” (April 2014, The Atlantic), Samuelson explains why philosophy (and the liberal arts in general) are socially valuable for working class individuals:
Traditionally, the liberal arts have been the privilege of an upper class. There are three big reasons for this. First, it befits the leisure time of an upper class to explore the higher goods of human life. . . Second, because their birthright is to occupy leadership positions in politics and the marketplace, members of the aristocratic class require the skills to think for themselves. Whereas those in the lower classes are assessed exclusively on how well they meet various prescribed outcomes, those in the upper class must know how to evaluate outcomes and consider them against a horizon of values. Finally (and this reason generally goes unspoken), the goods of the liberal arts get coded as markers of privilege and prestige, so that the upper class can demarcate themselves clearly from those who must work in order to make their leisure and wealth possible.
Learn to think clearly.
In the 2013 Salon article, “Be employable, study philosophy,” Shannon Rupp writes, “…a smattering of undergrad philosophy classes taught me something applicable to any and every job: clarity of thought. Name me one aspect of your life that doesn’t benefit from being able to think something through clearly.” (The article was originally published in The Tyee.)